2020. Unacknowledged Permissivism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101, 1: 158-183. [draft] [final version]

Abstract: Epistemic permissivism is the view that it is possible for two people to rationally hold incompatible attitudes toward some proposition on the basis of one body of evidence. In this paper, I defend a particular version of permissivism – unacknowledged permissivism (UP) – which says that permissivism is true, but that no one can ever rationally believe that she is in a permissive case. I show that counter to what virtually all authors who have discussed UP claim, UP is an attractive view: it is compatible with the intuitive motivations for permissivism and avoids a significant challenge to permissivism: the arbitrariness objection.

2019. Collectivized Intellectualism. (with Benjamin Wald). Res Philosophica 96, 2: 199-227. [draft] [final version]

Abstract: We argue that the evolutionary function of reasoning is to allow us to secure more accurate beliefs and more effective intentions through collective deliberation. This sets our view apart both from traditional intellectualist accounts, which take the evolutionary function to be individual deliberation, and from interactionist accounts such as the one proposed by Mercier and Sperber, which agrees that the function of reasoning is collective but holds that it aims to disseminate, rather than come up with, accurate beliefs. We argue that our collectivized intellectualism offers the best explanation of the range of biases that human reasoning is prone to, and that it does better than interactionism at offering a function of reasoning that would have been adaptive for our distant ancestors who first evolved this capacity.

2017. The Psychological Context of Contextualism. (with Jennifer Nagel). In The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism, edited by Jonathan Ichikawa, 94-104. New York: Routledge. [draft] [final version at Routeledge handbooks online]

work in progress

Here are some projects I'm currently working on (with titles removed to preserve blind review) . Please email me if you would like to see a draft.

  • A paper arguing that a subject who believes P while believing that disbelief that P is also rational on the basis of her evidence exhibits the same kind of intrapersonal incoherence as a subject who believes a Moorean proposition

  • A paper about the epistemic significance of agreement among professional philosophers

  • A paper about one of the most popular objections to epistemic permissivism and its connections to the lottery paradox and the preface paradox