I am a PhD candidate in philosophy at the University of Toronto.

My research is centered on questions about human reasoning and rationality. I am interested in the nature and substance of principles that govern belief; in particular, in cases where our natural limitations prevent us from living up to these principles.

In my dissertation, I argue for unacknowledged permissivism, the view that a single body of evidence sometimes rationalizes more than one doxastic attitude towards a proposition, but that subjects can never rationally believe that they are in such a case.

I am also interested in when and why we make assessments of the rationality of others, what role these assessments play in our pursuit of knowledge, and what these assessments can teach us about what rationality requires of us.

I have also written on the evolutionary function of human reason, and how recent research in psychology bears on contextualism about knowledge attributions.

Before arriving in Toronto, I completed an MA in philosophy at Northern Illinois University (2013), and an AB in philosophy at Princeton University (2010).